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CaseNo.20070840-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Jody Dale Parke,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the officer's protective search for weapons supported by reasonable
suspicion?
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's "underlying factual
findings are reviewed for clear error." State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,111,100 P.3d
1222. Its legal conclusions, including its application of the law to the facts, "are

reviewed non-deferentially for correctness/' State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 11,103
P.3d 699.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable atuse,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a tliird degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007). R. 1-2.
After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over to stand
trial. R. 24-25. Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a protective
weapons search of his person and automobile. R. 30-37. After hearing argument on
the matter, the trial court denied the motion. R. 92, 107-10, 122. Defendant
thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine as
charged, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's order denying his motion to
suppress. R. 97-106. Defendant timely appealed. R. 111-12.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On the evening of May 2, 2007, Officer Jimmy Anderson was patrolling an
area of South Salt Lake City that was "very dangerous." R. 41; R. 107: % 3. At
approximately 9:30 p.m., he saw a vehicle "pull out of [a] parking lot onto the main
roadway without stopping and checking for traffic." R. 40-41, 47; R. 107: f 2.
Officer Anderson pulled in behind the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. R. 41; R.
107: f 3. The vehicle, driven by Defendant, pulled into a theater parking lot and
stopped. R. 41; R. 107: f 3. As Officer Anderson got out of his patrol car, he saw
Defendant making "shoulder movements" and "reaching towards [his] waistband
area." R. 41; R. 108: % 4. Based on his "past experiences" in the area "with those
[types of] movements," Officer Anderson suspected that Defendant may be
"concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42; R. 108: f 5.
Officer Anderson "ordered [Defendant] to put his hands outside the window
so [he] could approach safely." R. 42; R. 108: ^ 5. Defendant, however, became
"somewhat agitated" and "questioned" the officer's order. R. 42; R. 108: % 6.
Although Defendant complied with the order, his agitation "raised" Officer
_ _ i —

.

1

The facts are taken from the unofficial transcript of the preliminary hearing
that was attached to Defendant's motion to suppress. See R. 38-50 (Addendum A).
The parties and the trial court below relied on this unofficial transcript. See 30-37,
84-91,107: f 1. Record cites to R. 107 followed by a paragraph number refer to the
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum B).
3

Anderson's suspicions "a little bit more." R. 42. Officer Anderson approached
Defendant and "asked him directly just to step out of the vehicle," so he could
"perform a weapons search of his person" to ensure his safety. R. 42-43; R. 108: % 7.
By this time, another officer arrived on the scene as a back-up. R. 42; R. 108: %
7. Officer Anderson performed a weapons frisk and felt what appeared to be a knife
in Defendant's pocket. R. 43; R. 108:18. He asked Defendant if it was a knife and,
when Defendant confirmed that it was, removed it from Defendant's pocket. R. 43;
R. 108: f 8. Officer Anderson then opened the driver's side door of Defendant's car
to commence a search for weapons in the driver's seat area. R. 43, 48. Upon
opening the door, Officer Anderson saw in plain view, between the driver's seat and
the door, a pink baggie containing a white crystallized substance, which the officer
recognized as methamphetamine. R. 43-44,49; R. 108: ^ff 9-10.
After finding the baggie of methamphetamine, Officer Anderson handcuffed
Defendant and searched him incident to arrest. R. 44. In that search, Officer
Anderson looked in a capsule that was attached to the pocket knife by a chain and
discovered another baggie of methamphetamine.

R. 44; R. 108: % 10.

He

transported Defendant to jail and booked him for possession of methamphetamine.
R.44.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A protective weapons search is justified where the facts and circumstances
known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences drawn by the officer
based on his or her experience and training, give rise to a reasonable belief that the
suspect is armed and dangerous. The trial court correctly concluded that Officer
Anderson's protective weapons search was supported by reasonable suspicion. The
stop was initiated and completed in an area of South Salt Lake that was 'Very
dangerous." When Officer Anderson got out of his patrol car, he saw Defendant
make a furtive gesture, reaching for his waistband area. Based on his experiences in
that area, Officer Anderson recognized Defendant's movements as consistent with
concealing a weapon or narcotics. To ensure his safety, Officer Anderson ordered
Defendant to place his hands outside the window of his car. Although Defendant
complied, he became "somewhat agitated" and questioned the order, which further
heightened Officer Anderson's suspicion that Defendant may be armed. These
facts, together with the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop, combined to
create a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may be armed and dangerous.

5

ARGUMENT
THE OFFICER'S PROTECTIVE SEARCH FOR WEAPONS WAS
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION
The sole question on appeal is whether the facts known to Office]: Anderson
justified a weapons search of Defendant's person and vehicle. The trial court
concluded that they did:
[Officer] Anderson testified that the area in which the defendant
was stopped was inherently dangerous. This belief, based on
experience and training along with movements made by the defendant,
reaching for his waistband area and shoulder movement, coupled with
his agitated state and apparent questioning nature toward Anderson,
properly led him to believe that the defendant might be armed and
dangerous. Anderson was concerned with his immediate safety and
took die appropriate steps to protect himself and others that may have
been in the area.
R. 109: f 4. The trial court's conclusion was correct. Accordingly, this Court should
affirm Defendant's conviction.
A. A protective weapons search is justified if supported by a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect may be armed and dangerous or may gain
immediate control of a weapon.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 24 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that where an officer has reason to believe that a lawfully detained person
"may be armed and presently dangerous," the officer may "conduct a carefully
limited search of the [person's] outer clothing" to determine "whether the person is
in fact carrying a weapon." Accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, If 13,78 P,3d 590. In
6

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Court extended the Terry rationale to
automobiles. Where there is reason to believe that a motor vehicle occupant may be
armed and dangerous, the officer may also conduct a "search of the passenger
compartment of [the] automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be
placed or hidden/' Id. at 1049-50; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at % 29.
An officer may not perform a protective search based on an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT
36, at Tf 14. The officer must have "some minimal level of objective justification."
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,217 (1984). Officers "must be able to point to specific
facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts," give rise to a
reasonable belief that the person may be presently armed or may gain immediate
control of a weapon. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at ^% 14 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30);
accord Long, 463 U.S at 1049-50. In assessing reasonable suspicion, officers may
"draw upon their own experience and training to make determinations based on the
cumulative facts before them that may elude an untrained person." Id. (citing
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002)).
In determining whether a particular protective search was justified, the
overarching question for courts is "whether 'the facts available to the officer at the
moment of... the search warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that
7

the action taken was appropriate."' Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 21-22). In other words, the search must be judged against an objective
standard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at f t 14,16. "Courts must
. . . avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from
each other/7 Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). Instead,
they "must view the articulable facts in their totality." Id. And although the Court
applies an objective standard, it must give "due weight to the specific reasonable
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f f 20-21

(recognizing that "an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances," based on his or
her training and experience, "factorfs] into the objective analysis").
B. Having been stopped in a car in an area that is dangerous,
Defendant's furtive movements and agitated state justified Officer
Anderson's protective weapons search.
Applying the objective, totality of the circumstances test to the facts in this
case, Officer Anderson was justified in performing the protective search of
Defendant's person and automobile. The State readily agrees with Defendant, see
Aplt. Brf. at 14-16, that the suspected traffic violation is not the kind of offense
which by its very nature gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was
armed and dangerous. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 32,103 P.3d 699 (recognizing
8

that in some cases, "the nature of the crime being investigated is sufficient to trigger
the officer's reasonable suspicion, such as a murder or robbery"). Nevertheless,
other facts and circumstances known to Officer Anderson at the time weighed in
favor of the reasonableness of the protective search. Id.
1. The location of the stop weighs in favor of the reasonableness of
the protective search.
At the outset, the reasonableness of the protective search must be weighed in
light of the location where the stop occurred—a "very dangerous area" of South Salt
Lake. R. 41. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "the relevant
characteristics of a location" are an appropriate factor "in determining whether the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious" to justify the officer's actions. Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124 (2000). This dangerous South Salt Lake area provided
Officer Anderson with important context in assessing the situation as it thereafter
unfolded.
Defendant takes issue, however, with the trial court's finding that the location
of the stop was "'a dangerous area for police officers to work.'" Aplt. Brf. at 11
(quoting trial court finding, R. 107: f 3). He argues that Officer Anderson's
testimony did not support that finding. He argues that the theater location was not
necessarily dangerous because Officer Anderson referred only generally to the area

9

he worked, without indicating the size of that area or whether the theater parking
lot in particular is dangerous. Aplt. Brf. at 11-12,17. His challenge is unavailing.
Contrary to Defendant's claim, Officer Anderson's testimony supported a
finding that the location of the stop—from its initiation to its completion—was in a
dangerous area—a factor appropriately considered in the trial court's reasonable
suspicion calculus. Officer Anderson characterized the area as "very dangerous" in
the course of explaining the reasons he suspected that Defendant was cirmed:
At that time as I was getting out of the vehicle, I saw the driver what
appeared to me as making (inaudible) movement urn . . . and which
caught my attention. In our area... it's a very dangerous area that we
work and a . . . with those movements in my past experiences u r n . . . I
have found people to be concealing either weapons or narcotics. So I
ordered the driver to put his hands outside the window so I could
approach safely.
R. 41-42. What is evident from Officer Anderson's testimony is that the area which
he was working was "very dangerous." Defendant did not challenge this testimony
below, nor did he introduce any evidence to suggest otherwise. Perhaps most
importantly, that area necessarily included the gas station where Officer Anderson
first observed Defendant. Presximably, it also included the theater where Officer
Anderson stopped Defendant a short distance later. Had it not, Officer Anderson
would not have factored that into his assessment of the situation.

10

Defendant also suggests that the theater location was not dangerous because
the stop was made at "at 9:30 p.m.[,] which... presumably is a time when it is lit
and populated with movie-goers entering and leaving the theaters/' Aplt. Brf. at 1112,17. Officer Anderson's characterization of the area as "very dangerous" came
without qualification, suggesting that the area is generally dangerous regardless of
the time. Certainly, there may be times when the area is more, or less, dangerous
than at other times. But again, the clear implication of Officer Anderson's testimony
is that the area is, in general, "very dangerous." Defendant has not pointed to
anything in the record that undermines that finding.
Finally, Defendant complains that the officer did not explain what is
dangerous about the area. Aplt. Brf. at 12. Again, however, the context of Officer
Anderson's testimony provides the explanation: "[I]t's a very dangerous area that
we work and . . . with those movements in my past experiences . . . I have found
people to be concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42. In other words,
people who frequent the area often carry weapons. His testimony also suggests that
the area is a hotbed of drug activity and that the people involved frequently carry
weapons or are otherwise dangerous. As noted, Defendant did not challenge below
the officer's testimony about the dangerousness of the area.

11

Certainly, Defendant's presence in this 'Very dangerous area" of South Salt
Lake, standing alone, was not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that he
represented a danger. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. However, it is a relevant factor
that provides context against which Defendant's subsequent actions may be judged.
See id.

2. Defendant's furtive movements weigh in favor of the
reasonableness of the protective search.
When Officer Anderson exited his patrol car, he observed Defendant making
what appeared to be furtive movements: he saw "shoulder movement" and
Defendant "reaching towards [his] waistband area." R. 41; R. 108: \ 4. These furtive
gestures, which Officer Anderson interpreted as an attempt to conceal either a
weapon or narcotics, see R. 41-42, further supported a reasonable suspicion that
Defendant may be armed and dangerous. See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870
(Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that defendant's furtive movements, consisting of
"moving and leaning as if he were trying to hide something," provided the officer
"a reasonable basis to search the defendant and the area within his immediate
control").
Defendant discounts his movements as "innocuous," arguing that he "could
have been reaching for his identification, turning off the radio, shifting positions,

12

scratching himself, or doing any number of non-threatening things/' Aplt. Brf. at
18-21. Certainly, innocent explanations may have existed for Defendant's actions.
But an officer "need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed," Terry,
392 U.S. at 27, nor is he required to "rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,"
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,277 (2002). All that is required is that the facts
support an inference that Defendant "may be armed and presently dangerous."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989) (observing that
the burden to establish reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence").
Had Officer Anderson provided no further description of Defendant's
movements in the car, they might not have added to the reasonable suspicion
calculus. But Officer Anderson explained that Defendant's movements were furtive
in nature and similar to movements made by others who were concealing weapons:
"[I]t's a very dangerous area that we work a n d . . . with those movements in my past
experiences... I have found people to be concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42
(emphasis added). In other words, based on his past experience with others in the
area, the movements did not appear to be innocent, but were consistent with the
concealment of either a weapon or narcotics.

13

This case is thus distinguishable from the two cases upon which Defendant
relies in his brief- State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and State v. White, 856
P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). See Aplt. Brf. at 18-21,23. Unlike Officer Anderson in
this case, the officers in Schlosser and White did not indicate they suspected, based on
the facts before them, that the defendant was armed and dangerous.
After being pulled over in Nephi, the defendant in Schlosser, a passenger in
the vehicle, bent forward, acted fidgety, turned to the left and turned to the left, and
turned back to look at the officer. Schlosser, 774: P.2d at 1133. The officer testified
that he inferred from Schlosser's movements that he was hiding contraband, but
expressed no suspicion that Schlosser may be hiding a weapon. Id. at 1133-34. The
supreme court thus rejected the State's claim that the stop was justified by a concern
for safety: "[The officer] cited no safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he
sought only to investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in illegal
activity, and for that reason he opened the passenger door." Id. at 1137. Other
factors, present here, were also missing in Schlosser. See, supra, at 9-12 (dangerous
area), and infra, at 18-19 (Defendant's questioning and agitated state in response to
officer's order to place his hands outside the window).
In White, the defendant's former wife notified police that White, who was on
parole for armed robbery, was with another woman in the back seat of a car parked
14

in a parking lot. Id. at 657. She alleged that he was high on cocaine and had been
involved in a domestic disturbance earlier that day. Id. Upon arriving at the
location, officers observed White in a car with a woman as described by White's exwife. Id. Before officers confronted White, an officer saw him "kind of leaning off to
his side a little bit." Id. at 661. However, the officer testified that he saw nothing
indicating that White was armed. Id. at 658. Thus, unlike Officer Anderson in this
case, the officer in White interpreted the suspect's movements as "innocuous." Id. at
661.2 Indeed, at the time, White was not even aware that police were watching him.
See id.

This case is distinguishable from Warren for the same reason. The officer
observed Warren, the driver of a stopped vehicle, conversing with a pedestrian at
4:45 a.m. at a deserted downtown location. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at ^f 3. After
watching the exchange for less than a minute, the pedestrian left on foot and Warren
drove away. Id. at ^f 3. Based on the hour and location, the officer suspected drug
activity or prostitution and followed Warren. Id. When Warren failed to signal, the
officer initiated a traffic stop. Id. at f 4. After discovering that Warren lied about his
2

The Court concluded that absent some external indicia that White was
armed and dangerous, his parole status, his alleged cocaine use, his alleged
involvement in an earlier disturbance, and the fact he was wearing a coat that could
conceal a weapon were not sufficient to justify a protective frisk. See id. at 660-63.
15

driver's license status, the officer decided to impound the car but release Warren on
a citation. Id. at ^f 5. Before completing the citation, he frisked Warren for weapons,
a procedure he followed "as a matter of routine on anyone he orders out of a
vehicle." Id. at f 6. The officer acknowledged that "he did not have any reason to
believe that [the driver] was armed." Id.
The supreme court considered the case "a difficult one," but ultimately
concluded that the weapons search was not justified—in large part because the
officer "testified repeatedly that he did not have any reason to believe Warren was
armed and dangerous." Id. at If Tf 30,33. In contrast, Officer Anderson testified that
he suspected Defendant was armed based on the dangerous location, Defendant's
furtive movements, and Defendant's agitated response to the officer's order to place
his hands outside the window. These are "the kind of obvious articulable facts" and
"alarming actions" that the Court in Warren found lacking. Id. at ^f 33.
In sum, the manner in which Defendant moved his shoulders and reached for
his waistband area may very well have appeared innocent to the untrained
observer.

However, based on his experience, Officer Anderson recognized

Defendant's movements as an attempt to conceal either a weapon or drugs. As a
trained and experienced law enforcement officer, Officer Anderson was "in the best
position to evaluate the circumstances" and interpret the actions of Defendant.
16

Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 20. This Coxirt should give "due weight" to Officer
Anderson's interpretation of the facts, which he made "in light of his experience/'
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
3. Defendant's agitated state weighs in favor of the reasonableness
of the protective search.
Further adding to the reasonable suspicion calculus in this case was
Defendant's behavior when Officer Anderson asked him to place his hands outside
the window. Defendant asserts that he "readily complied" with the order, Aplt. Brf.
at 22-23, 25, but the officer's testimony belies that assertion. Officer Anderson
testified that when he asked Defendant to place his hands outside the window,
Defendant "became somewhat agitated.. a n d . . . questioned [Officer Anderson's]
instructions." R. 42. Defendant's demeanor "raised [Officer Anderson's] suspicions
a little bit more," R. 42, and validly so. In Warren, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that a suspect's "willing compliance" with an officer's order is a factor
weighing against a valid protective search. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at Tf 32. Conversely,
an agitated and questioning reaction to an officer's order is a factor weighing in
favor of a protective search. See id. at f 33 & n.5 (suggesting that where the stop is
made late at night or in a high crime area, a boisterous or aggressive attitude by the
suspect may be sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
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armed and dangerous); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (recognizing that "nervous, evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion").
4. The inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop weighs in favor of
the reasonableness of the protective search.
A final factor weighing in favor of the reasonableness of the protective search
in this case was the inherent danger posed by the traffic stop itself. As recognized in
Warren, traffic stops are inherently dangerous and that fact is, therefore, a relevant
consideration in the reasonable suspicion determination. Warren, 2003IJT 36, at \ \
22-23.
In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court recognized the dangers
faced by law enforcement officers: "every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are
inflicted with guns and knives." Id. at 23. Unfortunately, the trend continues today.
In 2007, fifty-seven law enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the line of
duty, bringing the total to 549 in the last decade.

See Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted
("LEOKA") (1998-2007), located online athttp://www.fbi.gOv/ucr/ucr.htm#leoka).

18

The risk of assault to officers is not confined to situations involving burglaries,
robberies, drug raids, or domestic disputes, but extends to so-called "routine" traffic
stops. As recognized by the Tenth Circuit, "officers face a very real risk of being
assaulted with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle." United States v.
Holt, 264 F.3d 1215,1223 (10th Cir. 2001). TypicaUy,"[t]he officer.. .has to leave his
vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential assault by the motorist." Id. When
doing so, the officer does "not know[ ] who the motorist is or what the motorist's
intentions might be." Id. This represents an "inordinate risk" to officer safety.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 330,333 (1977).
In 2006 alone, almost 6,500 officers were assaulted while handling traffic stops
and pursuits. LEOKA (2006), Table 71. Eight of those officers were killed, bringing
the total to 50 since the turn of the century. LEOKA (2006), Table 19.3 In all, 291
officers were assaulted with firearms and 37 with knives while handling traffic
violation stops. LEOKA (2006), Table 71. Another 2,300 officers were assaulted
with dangerous weapons other than firearms or knives. LEOKA (2006), Table 19. In
short, "[a]n officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his

Since 2000, more officers have been killed while handling traffic violation
stops (50) than have been killed while handling domestic quarrels (38). See LEOKA
(2006), Table 19.
19

or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every stop, after all, is a confrontation."
HoZf, 264 F.3d at 1223.
Utah officers are not immune from the threat to officer safety duuing traffic
stops. Just last month, a Lehi City officer was shot twice in the head during a traffic
stop for suspicion of DUI. See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Lehi officer shot Police kill
woman who opened fire, Deseret News, June 24,2008. In State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,
994 P.2d 177, a Utah Highway Patrol trooper was assaulted with a firearm after
pulling a car over for expired registration and a minor equipment violation. The
trooper became concerned for his safety as soon as he saw the front passenger
"make furtive movements in the area of the floor of the passenger's side door/' Id.
at 13. After a back-up officer arrived, the trooper frisked a back seat passenger and
then turned his attention to the front passenger. Id. at f ^f 3-4. After refusing to
show his hands while still in the car, the front passenger "suddenly jerked, pulling
his right hand from underneath [his] coat, [and] thrust[ed] a handgun up toward"
the trooper. Id. at f 5. The two officers immediately opened fire, disabling the front
passenger. Id. at ^ 5-6. The trooper's assessment of the passenger's movements,
like Officer Anderson's assessment of Defendant's actions, may very well have
eluded the untrained and inexperienced eye, but it likely saved his life. See

20

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=^

(recording of the

incident from the trooper's in car camera).
Defendant argues, however, that even if there was reasonable suspicion that
he posed a danger, Officer Anderson "mitigated th[at] danger by ordering [him] to
put his hands outside the vehicle" and could have fxirther "dispelled any remaining
danger by ordering [him] to exit the vehicle." Aplt. Brf. at 13-14,23-25. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Long flatly rejected this sort of argument, holding that the Fourth
Amendment does "not require[ ] that officers adopt alternate means to ensure their
safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry [search]." Long, 463 U.S. at
1052 & n. 16. As noted by the Court, a Terry suspect may still "reach into his
clothing and retrieve a weapon" or "break away from police control and retrieve a
weapon from his automobile." Id. at 1051. Defendant's "alternative means"
argument thus fails.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent dangerousness of a
traffic stop "can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the
vehicle." Warren, 2003 UT 36, at \ 22. The court was quick to observe, however,
that "ordering occupants out of a vehicle during a traffic stop will [not] necessarily
eliminate all danger

[A] suspect may still gain access to a vehicle even after the

officer orders the suspect out of the vehicle." Id. at % 28 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at
21

1051-52). Where no other circumstances give rise to a suspicion that the occupants
of a vehicle may be armed and dangerous, the inherent dangers of the traffic stop
will not support a protective search. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 33. In that case,
ordering the occupants to exit the vehicle sufficiently "decrease[s] the inherent
dangerousness of the traffic stop." Id.
On the other hand, where separate indicia exist suggesting the actual presence
of a weapon, ordering occupants out of the vehicle is not sufficient to mitigate the
danger. In a case cited favorably by this Court in Bradford, 839 P.2d at 870, the
Washington Court of Appeals aptly explained the shortcomings of simply ordering
the exit of a passenger who was seen trying to conceal something during the stop:
Just as [the occupant] could have hid a gun under the driver's seat, he
could have picked one up from that location and put it on his person.
In the course of attempting to hide a gun, he [also] could have changed
his mind and kept it on his person.. ..
State v. Wilkinson, 785 P.2d 1139,1142 (Wash. App. 1990). In other words, having
witnessed the furtive gesture, simply ordering Defendant out of the car would not
mitigate the danger to Officer Anderson—Defendant may have concealed a weapon
on his person. See R. 43; R. 108: f 8 (a pocket knife was in fact found in Defendant's
pocket).
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* * *

In sum, the facts known to Officer Anderson, together with the inferences
which he was entitled to make based on his experience, were sufficient to support a
reasonable suspicion that Defendant "may be armed and presently dangerous/7
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted July J_L 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

S.GRAY

//<

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

4

Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding, R. 107: f 2, that Officer
Anderson saw him pull out of the gas station parking lot "without stopping or
checking for traffic/' Aplt. Brf. at 11 (emphasis added). The State agrees that Officer
Anderson testified that he pulled out "without stopping and checking for traffic." R.
41 (emphasis added). However, the State does not agree that the finding in any real
way changed the meaning of the officer's testimony.
23
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STATE OF UTAH V. JODY DALE PARKE
Case No. 071903540FS
June 14,2007
PRELIMINARY HEARING
JUDGE SHEILA MCCLEVE
Attorney for Plaintiff: Byron F. Burmester (ATP)
Attorney for Defendant: Michael D. Misner (ATD)

1 J:

Well let's do it. Which is it?

2 ATD: Your Honor it's the matter of Jody Parke. He's in custody.
3 J:

State vs. Parke. Do we have a prosecutor?

4 ATD: Mr. Burmester I think is out getting his witnesses,
5 J:

Okay. He disappeared. No there he is.

6 ATP: (inaudible) have two witnesses Your Honor.
7 J:

We need a defendant, just one second. When we get the defendant, we'll.. .we'll do it.

8

So Mr. Park are you right handed or left?

9 D:

I'm left.

10 J:

K. Have a seat there and we'll uncuff your left hand so you can write notes to Mr.

11

Misner if you need to. I have one count of unlawful possession of a controlled

12

substance, methamphetamine, a third degree felony at 33rd South State. I assume you

13

waive further reading.

14 ATD: We do Your Honor.
15 J:

And Mr. Burmester you said you've got two witnesses?

16 ATP: I do.

1

1 J:

Go ahead.

2 ATP: Would you like them both brought up to be sw.. .to be sworn in at the same time.
3 J:

No I figure you just do it unless there's a motion made.

4 ATP: Sorry.
5 J:

And...and that's the way I do it. Oh...one at a time.

6 ATP: Oh one at a time.
7 J:

Unless there's a motion made...

8 ATP: You first (inaudible).
9 J:

which there hasn't been.

10 ATP: Yes.
11 J:

Come on up and be sworn.

12

Witness sworn in.

13 J:

Then just have a seat at the witness stand. I guess that really wasn't clear, you just

14

proceed as normal calling witnesses (inaudible) unless there's a motion.

15 ATP: Okay. I'm sorry.
16 J:

Go ahead.

17 ATP: Please state your full name and spell your last name.
18 W:

Jimmy Cole Anderson, A N D E R S O N .

19 ATP: Sir a.. .are you a a.. .police officer with South Salt Lake City Police Department?
20 W:

I am.

21 ATP: How long have you been with South Salt Lake?
22 W:

Approximately 4 years.

23 ATP: What's your current duty assignment?

2

1 W:

Patrol Officer canine division.

2 ATP: K. Um... Were you serving in that same capacity on May 2nd of this year?
3 W:

Yes.

4 ATP: And um.. .have you during your career, have you received any training on a.. .drugs?
5 W:

I have.

6 ATP: Um... How about the drug methamphetamine?
7 W:

I have.

8 ATP: And have you a.. .had an opportunity in that training to have methamphetamine shown
9
10 W:

to you?
Yes I have.

11 ATP: And a.. .have you had any situations where you've a.. .in.. .in the process of doing your
12

work as a police officer s.. .a.. .been involved in an arrest or investigation of

13

methamphetamine?

14 W:

Yes many...many times.

15 ATP: About how many?
16 W:

Um.. .1 would say over 50.

17 ATP: I'm sorry.
18 W:

Over 50.

19 ATP: Over 50. And have you seen a.. .methamphetamine that many times?
20 W:

I have.

21 ATP: Okay. On a.. .May 2nd of this year, did you have an occasion to be in the vicinity of
22

33rd South and State Street?

23 W:

I was.

3

1 ATP: Okay. On that urn.. .is that address in Salt Lake County?
2 W:

It is.

3 ATP: On that... about what time was it when you were there in May.
4 W:

Urn.. .Let me refer to my report here. I know it was in the evening hours at about, yea,

5

about 9:30.

6 ATP: So was it dark then?
7 W:

Yes.

8 ATP: And a.. .did you see some sort of traffic offense or something that drew your attention?
9 W:

I was actually at about 300 East and 3300 South. At 310 East is a location of a...of

10

a.. .gas station. I saw a vehicle pull out of the parking lot onto the main roadway

11

without stopping and checking for traffic.

12 ATP: Okay. So what did you do?
13 W:

I then a.. .got behind the vehicle and made a traffic stop at about 3300 South and State

14

at the Century Theatres parking lot.

15 ATP: Did the vehicle stop immediately or...
16 W:

A.. .p.. .yea.. .af.. .it pulled into the dr.. .into the parking lot of the Century Tlieatres and

17

then stopped.

18 ATP: What did you do next?
19 W:

At that time as I was getting out of the vehicle, I saw the driver what appealed to me as

20

making (inaudible) movements as in reaching towards waistband area. I could see

21

shoulder movement um...and which caught my attention. In our area...it's; a very

22

dangerous area that we work and a... with those movements in my past experiences

4

1

um.. .1 have found people to be concealing either weapons or narcotics. So I ordered

2

the driver to put his hands outside the window so I could approach safely.

3 ATP: Were you outside you car at that point?
4 W:

I was.

5 ATP: Okay. And so did he do that?
6 W:

A.. .He became somewhat agitated. I could tell in his voice and he a.. .questioned my

7

a.. .instructions a.. .which even raised by suspicions a little bit more. He did comply

8

though.

9 ATP: Were there any other occupants besides this driver?
10 W:

No. Just the driver.

11 ATP: Do you see that driver here in the court today?
12 W:

I do.

13 ATP: Would you point him out and describe what he's wearing.
14 W:

He's sitting here. He's in a gray jump suit.

15 ATP: May the record reflect identification Your Honor.
16 J:

Yes.

17 ATP: So um.. .you said that though agitated the defendant put his hands outside the window,
18

what happened next?

19 W:

K. Um.. .Another officer a... was.. .had shown up, that's my back up. He just saw me

20

on the traffic stop and showed up. I approached the vehicle and asked the driver a.. .1

21

believe for his identification. I think I asked him directly just to step out of the vehicle

22

where I was gonna perform a weapons search of his person so I could deal with him in

23

a... safety.

5
A >-%

1 ATP: Okay. So did you do that?
2 W:

Yes I asked him to step out. A weapons search was conducted as I was...

3 ATP: By who?
4 W:

Byrne.

5 ATP: Okay.
6 W:

Um.. .1 felt what appeared a.. .to me to be knife in his pocket. Before I went into his

7

pocket I asked him if that was a knife and he said it was. I then went into the pocket

8

and retrieved the knife. Um...On the knife was a.. .connected with a chain and a

9

capsule. So I then placed that a.. .1 believe I put the knife in my pocket and then I had

10

officer, my back up officer, a.. .watch Mr. Parke as I conducted a a.. .weapons search of

11

the driver's seat area just to make sure that we.. .there was nothing, no weapons there

12

that could harm us. As I opened the door to perform that search, I could see a pink

13

baggie of a white crystallized substance. It looked like it was right on the side of the

14

seat about to fall out of the vehicle so...

15 ATP: Can you stop for just one second.
16 W:

Go ahead.

17 J:

Go ahead.

18 ATP: You said you saw a pink baggie where?
19 W:

As you open the door um.. .right along the frame of the vehicle in the sea... in the

20

driver's seat, there's a.. .a baggie right there.

21 ATP: So you didn't have to move anything around or...
22 W:

I didn't.

23 ATP: K. And a... did you.., did you see what was inside of it?

6

1 W:

Yea. I recognized the substance as a white crystallized substance which I.. .1 believed

2

to be methamphetamine.

3 ATP: So what happened next?
4 W:

At that time, the a.. .defendant was handcuffed and searched incident to arrest. Another

5

baggie of a white crystallized substance that I believed to be methamphetamine was

6

also found in the capsule that was connected to the knife by the chain.

7 ATP: Okay. So did you do something with those two baggies?
8 W:

They were booked into evidence. I a.. .a.. .Mr. Parke was transported and booked on

9

the charges. I did not have any a.. .test kits...

10 ATP: Uhu.
11 W:

a... to perform a field test kit a... so they were booked into evidence.

12 ATP: And how did you package them?
13 W:

I put 'em in an envelope and taped it up and initialed it.

14 ATP: Okay so could you describe those two baggies for me please.
15 W:

A... One was a...a clear baggie that was a little bit larger than the a...other baggie I

16

would say approximately 2 inches by 2 inches. And the other one was about a inch by

17

inch and it was a pink baggie.

18 ATP: The smaller one was...
19 W:

Both contained the white crystallized substance.

20 ATP: But you then took those two baggies and placed them into one...
21 W:

Correct, one envelope.

22 ATP: May I approach the witness Your Honor?
23 J:

Yes.

7

1 ATP: I'm handing the witness what has been marked the State's exhibit one. I guess I
2

should.. .Do you recognize this sir?

3 W:

Yes.

4 ATP: And what is that?
5 W:

This is the envelope in which I packaged the nar.. .the a.. .methamphetamine.

6 ATP: Okay.
7 W:

The baggies.

8 ATP: Okay. The two baggies. Okay.
9 W:

The two baggies.

10 ATP: And urn.. .does it.. .does it appear to be substantially similar condition than when you
11

last saw it?

12 W:

Um.. .The bottom has been opened and re-sealed.

13 ATP: Okay. And how about the top?
14 W:

The top um.. .has been opened and re-sealed.

15 ATP: Okay. Now do you know who opened and resealed those, that envelope?
16 W:

I do. There was a supplemental report in which the a.. .case manager the detective had

17

requested um...our crime lab technician to a...field test the baggies.

18 ATP: Okay so was one of them opened by her?
19 W:

Yes.

20 ATP: K. And the other one?
21 W:

And the other one was opened by me.

22 ATP: When?
23 W:

Earlier today.

8

1 ATP: Okay. And who was there?
2 W:

A... You were and also a.. .Danielle who is the crime lab technician.

3 ATP: It that the a...
4 W:

Danielle Nielson.

5 ATP: Okay.
6 ATD: Judge if it'll save time, for purposes of this hearing, we stipulate to chain of custody.
7

We stipulate to the.. .the crime lab's testing as preliminary a.. .field test that this was

8

positive for methamphetamine.

9 J:

Is that the stipulation?

10 ATP: That it is.. .that the urn... yea that the test was...
11 ATD: That this was methamphetamine.
12 ATP: Methamphetamine. Yes.
13 ATD: For purposes of this hearing.
14 J:

Okay.

15 ATP: So I guess I go get the (inaudible).
16 J:

Urn...

17 ATP: I guess that would be it
18 J:

Okay.

19 ATP: Thank you.
20 J:

Mr. Misner.

21 ATD: Can you tell me what the statute is for a... pulling out of a parking lot without stopping?
22 W:

I don't have the statute on hand, I'm sorry.

9

1 ATD: Okay. Did you watch him get into the car, pull out.. .1 mean, how much of that did you
2

see:

3 W:

I just saw him drive the vehicle out of the parking lot. He was coming out of the

4

parking onto the roadway. At that time, I pulled in behind him.

5 ATD: Okay I mean, so did you see him like drive 15 feet in the parking lot before exiting onto
6

the street or did you see two feet of that 5, you know what I mean.

7 W:

A.. .It was approximately 10 to 20 feet.

8 ATD: Okay. Um... When you say after.. .after you got him out of the vehicle you were gonna
9

do a weapons search. A... What does... what does that weapons search, what does that

10

phrase mean?

11 W:

It's a.. .um cursery search the outside of their clothing um... and it's just checking

12

strictly for weapons.

13 ATD: Okay. It is actually a search or are you talking about the Terry frisk?
14 W:

The Terry frisk.

15 ATD: And th...it's a little pocket knife?
16 W:

Correct.

17 ATD: And it's... it's... it's on some kind of chain or key ring?
18 W:

At that time I could just feel the pocket knife.

19 ATD: Well once you got it out and
20 W:

and saw it.

Right. Yea, it had a chain hooked to it with a little capsule.

21 ATD: Okay, keys?
22 W:

A.. .1 don't know if there was keys hooked to it. There may have been.

23 ATD: Okay, what (inaudible)...

10

1 W:

I didn't document it in my report though so I can't remember.

2 ATD: What end.. .what ended up happening to the knife and the chain?
3 W:

A... I believe it was booked. I'm not exactly sure. I don't know if it was returned to

4

him or if I booked it.

5 ATD: Okay. Do you remember any other keys?
6 W:

I can check the involvements. Um.. .There was some keys.

7 ATD: Okay. Separate from that or it might have been?
8 W:

It could have been I don't.. .I'm not exactly positive.

9 ATD: Okay. And registration on the vehicle?
10 W:

Um.. .1 don't believe Jody was the registered owner.

11 ATD: Okay.
12 W:

I think that's the reason why the vehicle was impounded is cuz we couldn't get hold of

13

the registered owner to pick it up.

14 ATD: Okay. But it wasn't a stolen vehicle?
15 W:

No.

16 ATD: Um.. .So then when you say that you have Jody out of the vehicle and you have.. .you
17

found the knife....

18 W:

Mhum.

19 ATD: um... you asked the other officer to watch him....
20 W:

Right.

21 ATD: while you did a weapons search of the driver area.
22 W:

Right.

23 ATD: So a terry frisk of the driver's seat.

11

1 W:

Sure, yes.

2 ATD: Um... And at that point you opened the door to the car.
3 W:

Correct.

4 ATD: Okay and the baggie that you saw isn't between the two seats, it's between the door and
5

the seat?

6 W:

Correct.

7 ATD: I would assume if the car was not registered for him and you were going to impound it
8

that you would locate the keys to the car and keep the keys as well.

9 W:

Um...normally the keys are a.. .the are sent with the vehicle.

10 ATD: Okay. At what point did you place Jody under arrest?
11 W:

Once I saw the.. .the pink baggie, the baggie between the door and driver's seat.

12 ATD: Okay.
13 W:

And he was placed in the handcuffs.

14 ATD: Okay. Thank you. I have nothing further Judge.
15 J:

Any redirect?

16 ATP: Just very short Your Honor. You said that um.. .you told the defense attorney that
17

on.. .when you saw the car coming towards the road (inaudible) parking lot that you

18

saw it for 10 or 20 feet. When you first saw that car was it moving or was it stopped?

19 W:

It was moving.

20 ATP: So it made a (inaudible) when you first saw it was moving?
21 W:

Correct.

22 ATP: Nothing further.
23 J:

Anything on that?

12

1 ATD: (inaudible).
2 J:

You may step down.

3 W:

Thank you.

4 J:

K. Anything else?

5 ATP: No Your Honor.
6 J:

State rests?

7 ATP: Yes, I'm sorry. The State rests.
8 ATD: You're a...for the record a...Mr. Parke we have...we've talked about this before. You
9

have the right to testify today and we can put on evidence. A... It's my advice that we

10

not do that at this hearing. Are you willing to take my advice?

11 D:

Yes.

12 ATD: (inaudible).
13 J:

Submit it.

14 ATP: Yes.
15 ATD: We would Judge.
16 J:

Okay. So Mr. Parke they've given me enough evidence today a.. .to believe that the

17

illegal possession of meth, a controlled substance occurred and also reason to believe

18

that you committed it. So I'm gonna order that you stand trial. We'll set it before Judge

19

Maughan for arraignment and scheduling and that will be...

20 C:

June 25th.

21 J:

25th of June at 9:00, 9:00 June 25th.

22 ATP: Thank you.
23 ATD: Thank you Your Honor.

13

1 J:

K. sThank you, we'll excuse you.

2
3
4
5
6
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsCaseNo.071903540
Jody Dale Parke,
Hon. Paul G. Maughn
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress having been raised in Court in the above entitled matter
in which a hearing was conducted on August 20,2007. Defendant was represented by counsel,
Wes Howard and Michael Misner, and the State was represented by Deputy District Attorney,
Byron F. Burmester. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Counsel for both the State and Defendant submitted memoranda. Evidence was was
takenfromthe transcript of the Preliminary Hearing that was conducted on June 24, 2007.
2. Police Officer, Jimmy Cole Anderson, of the Salt Lake Police Department witnessed
the defendant pull out of a parking lot of a gas station onto the main roadway without stopping
or checking for traffic at 310 East 3300 South in Salt Lake County.
3. Officer Anderson initiated a traffic stop and the defendant stopped in the parking lot
of the Century Theatres near 300 East 3300 South. Officer Anderson testified that in his
experience this location is a dangerous area for police officers to work.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 071903540
Page 2
4. Once stopped, the Officer saw the Defendant begin to make shoulder movements and
reach for his waistband area.
5. Anderson ordered the defendant to place his hands outside the window. Based on the
experience of the officer, he was afraid that the defendant might be trying to conceal and/or
reach for a weapon.
6. The defendant then became agitated and questioned the instructions given by
Anderson. Nevertheless, the defendant complied with the instructions.
7. After he received back-up, Officer Anderson approached the driver amd asked him
for his identification and to step out of the vehicle for a weapons pat-down of his person.
8. During the pat down search, Anderson felt an object contained within the defendant's
pocket which Anderson thought to be a knife. Anderson then asked the defendant if there was a
knife in the pocket before retrieving the object. The defendant confirmed that the object was a
knife, at which time Anderson retrieved the knife and placed it in his own pocket. The knife
was connected with a chain to a capsule.
9. After retrieving the knife, Anderson opened the door to conduct a weapons search of
the driver's seat area to ensure that the knife was the only weapon available to the defendant.
As he opened the door, Anderson saw a pink baggie between the driver's seat and the door,
about to fall out of the car. The officer recognized that the baggie contained a crystallized
substance which appeared to be methamphetamine.
10. Anderson did not move anything around in the vehicle to see the baggie. The
officer then handcuffed the Defendant and searched him incident to arrest. It was during that
search when the officer discovered that the capsule contained additional methamphetamine.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. During investigative stops, including traffic stops, an officer may perform a patdown search where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
2. Officer safety is the primary objective justifying an officer's right to perform a patdown search.
3. Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into
account an officer's reasonable inferences based on training, experience, and common sense.
The Court's analysis may include the subjective belief of the officer as a factor in determining
whether there was a reasonable suspicion.
4. Anderson testified that the area in which the defendant was stopped was inherently
dangerous. This belief, based on experience and training along with movements made by the
defendant, reaching for his waistband area and shoulder movement, coupled with his agitated
state and apparent questioning nature toward Anderson, properly led him to believe that the
defendant might be armed and dangerous. Anderson was concerned with his immediate safety
and took the appropriate steps to protect himself and others that may have been in the area.
5. An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the
suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons.
6. Because the knife was discovered and the officer previously noted the defendant's
agitated state, it was proper to conclude that he might well be dangerous. Therefore, if
probable cause did not exist, Anderson was still justified in searching the vehicle due to the
perceived dangerousness of the defendant.
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7. The methamphetamine was located in a baggie between the driver's seat and the door
in plain view after the door was opened. Anderson was not required to ignore the substance.
After this discovery, Anderson properly placed defendant under arrest.
8. The search of the capsule attached to the knife was justified because the defendant
was then under arrest and search of the capsule was subsequent to that arrest.

